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Theories of emotion4/5/2023 O argumentare a importanței dualiste a emoțiilor în societate, individual și la nivel de comunitate. The paper also applies the intentional-evaluative model of affective shifts to anxiety in more detail, developing the idea that certain patterns of affective shift, particularly those that allow for a kind of ‘emotional release’, can contribute to a subject’s well-being. At same the time, the account is pitched at the phenomenological level, as dealing with affective shifts primarily in terms of moods and emotions as experiential states, with respect to which it feels-like-something to be undergoing the relevant affective experience. ) affective shifts – which I document across this paper – in terms of intentional and evaluative aspects of the respective states of moods and emotion. I argue that we do best to understand important features of these (. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. However, a partial reconciliation of the two theories is possible with respect to the concept of “affectively tinged” thoughts. I therefore recommend abandoning the belief-desire compound theory of the nature of emotions in favor of the causal feeling theory. The causal feeling theory avoids these problems. Third, I present three objections against the hypothesis that beliefs and desires are components of emotions: This hypothesis fails, at second sight, to explain the directedness of emotions at specific objects it has difficulty accounting for the duration of emotional reactions caused by the fulfillment of desires and the disconfirmation of beliefs and there are reasons to question the existence of the postulated emotional gestalts and the process that presumably generates them. Second, I examine the two main arguments for regarding beliefs and desires as emotion components-that doing so is needed to explain the finer distinctions among emotions and their object-directedness-and argue that they are unconvincing: Emotions can be distinguished by referring to their cognitive and motivational causes, and their appearance of object-directedness could be an illusion. ) argue that affective feelings should be regarded as components of emotions because this assumption provides the best available explanation of the phenomenal character and the intensity of emotional experiences. My argumentation for the causal feeling theory proceeds in three steps. By contrast, I propose that emotions are affective feelings caused by beliefs and desires, without the latter being a part of the emotion. Let us assume that the basic claim of the belief-desire theory of emotion is true: What, then, is an emotion? According to Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009), emotions are mental compounds that emerge from the gestalt integration of beliefs, desires, and hedonic feelings (pleasure or displeasure).
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